Abstract Recent literature contains influential arguments for variabilism, the view that we should understand proper names as analogues not of constants, but of variables. In particular, proper names are said to sometimes take semantic values that are not referential but purely general. I present a counterexample to this view.
These truth conditions, notice, are purely general. They do not refer to anybody in particular; they simply require the existence of some gentleman as described.
Cumming is drawing from an older tradition that maintains that names can have such purely general, bound-variable, non-referential semantic values. The tradition goes back at least to Tyler Burge in 1973: Sometimes names lack designations. . . . There are . . . cases in which the demonstrative acts as a bound variable-as when we say, "Someone cast the first stone.
Whoever he was, call him 'Alfred'. (That) Alfred was a hypocrite. " (Burge, 1973:435-36) The view can look particularly attractive for certain modal or attitude contexts:
Perhaps Mary has a son named 'John' and perhaps John is the thief.
Mary is under the illusion that she has a son named 'John' and she believes that John is the thief. (Geurts, 1999:205) (18) had in mind. However, it is possible that one who utters (18) has no-one in mind (consider [Sherlock] Holmes concluding (18) on the basis of statistical patterns of pedestrian traffic in the park). It is also plausible that (18) is true even if the speaker is wrong about the person they had in mind, so long as there was another man who acted in the manner described. On such an understanding of (18), the occurrence of 'Ernest' , 4 ) . 6 is interpreted, not referentially, but as an existentially bound variable (Cumming, 2013) . (Cumming, 2008:542-43) .
Why is this particularly worrisome? Because variabilists cannot simply amend the above at will. There is a very good reason why Cumming allows indefinites to bind any names that occur to their right, even when these names are not in the indefinites' scopes. In examples such as (1), the names are anaphoric on indefinites that occur in sentences that precede them in the discourse. Those names are not in the scopes of their binders, but they are, nevertheless, to their right.
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The problem, however, is that in (3) this kind of out-of-scope, left-to-right binding does not (and cannot) occur.
(As an interesting side note, if we replace the unquoted name with a pronoun we get a case of donkey anaphora: (4) Every time a gentleman named 'Ernest' walks into a bar, he tells a joke.
Unlike (3), (4) is clearly acceptable. It is a virtue of Cumming's view that it would allow usif we applied it to pronouns -to explain donkey anaphora without positing E-type pronouns or discourse referents.)
What can be done to rescue variabilism? I can imagine two approaches. First, variabilists could claim that our counterexample would actually allow the bound reading as far as semantics itself is concerned, but that the reading is blocked by some kind of catastrophic pragmatic failure. Perhaps similar, but less catastrophic pragmatic failures occur in in-between cases such as on page 2.
For instance, maybe names are used with a presupposition of uniqueness, a presupposition that clashes in (3) with the universal quantifier. This doesn't seem very likely though, because we can say:
(5) Every Henry was a Tudor.
(England had eight kings named 'Henry, ' of whom only two belonged to the Tudor dynasty.) Albeit false, (5) is grammatical. The universal quantifier doesn't clash with the hypothesized presupposition of uniqueness. Second, it also seems possible that variabilists could explain away (3) by modifying Binding Theory. Binding Theory is the branch of grammar that studies the syntactic constraints on the distribution (i. e., on the relative positions) of coreferential or co-indexed names, pronouns, descriptions, etc. In principle, we could uncover constraints of this sort that would enable us to explain away the counterexample (3).
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